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1.
Intro duct Ion.
The Congress of Panama net in the city of that name in June 1826.
Four nations - Colombia, L'cxico, Central America and Peru - partici-
pated in the deliberations of the congress. Great Britain and Holland
were represented by unofficial agents.
Other nations had been invited to o.ttend the congress, but owing
to various reasons, failed to be represented. Included in thi3 latter
Croup was the United States of America. A prolonged debate had taken
place in the Congress of the United States on the subject of the ex-
pediency of that country attending the Congress of Panama. The result
Was that the delegates were not finally commissioned until May 8, 1826
and it was mid-June before Mr. Anderson, the United States minister to
Colombia, and one of the delegates chosen to represent the United States
at the congress, started for Panama. Snroute he tool: ill with, a fever
and died before reaching his destination.
Mr. Sergeant, of Pennsylvania, the other United States delegate,
refused to go to Panama in the summer season because of the extreme
heat and the generally unhealthful conditions and offered to resign
(1)
his commission. Mr. Clay, the Secretary of State, permitted
Mr. Sergeant to postpone his departure until the autumn.
By that time the Congress of Panama had been adjourned to Tacu-
baya, Mexico.. Thither Mr. Sergeant traveled in the autumn of 1826.
Colombia was the only other nation to send delegates to Tacubaya and
so the adjourned meeting of the congress never took place.
Very little of practical importance was accomplished by the
Congress of Panama. Even the conventions drawn up at Panama between
the representatives of the Spanish American States present, were
ratified by Colombia only.
(1) See page 44, below.
<
But did the United States miss an opportunity for good by failing
to participate in the Congress of Panama? In the following pages we
Shall examine into certain details of the story of the congress, 3tress-
ing in particular the attitude of the United States Congress with re-
gard to it. By so doing we hope to arrive at a probable answer to
the above question.
Status
J. \
Latin American Stater: in i:::lC> .
TO miderstand the story of the Congress of Panama it is well to
bear in mind the position in world affairs which the Latin American
states had assumed by 1826.
By that year all of the former colonies of Spain on the mainland
of America had revolted and had set up independent governments, every
one of which, had, by 1326, become a republic in form. These new states
had been recognised as independent by the United States and Great Britain.
But Spain had not, as yet, aclmowleclged their independence. Thus the
Spanish American states were living in more or less fear of an attack
by Spain or rather by Spain supported and abetted by the Holy Alliance.
In the former Portuguese colony of Brazil, an independent empire
had been set up with Dom Pedro, the son of the King of Portugal as
"Constitutional Emperor and Perpetual Defender of 3razil. H (1) In
1S25 Portugal had recognized the independence of its former colony.
The Spanish American states, in their war with Spain, looked upon
Brazil as a neutral.
Of all the colonies of Spain in America the only ones which had
# not broken away from her sway were the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico
in the 'Jest Indies.
Colombia and Mexico were planning attacks upon these islands in
order to wrest them from Spain, These war-like plans troubled the
United States which was determined that Cuba, lying in such close
(1) Lockey, J. B. Pan-Americanism, Its Beginnings, p. 57
<
proximity to its own shores, could never be held by any nation but
Spain. Accordingly, the United States had requested Colombia and
irexico to suspend their aggressive pre >arations until the outcome of
certain negotiations, leading toward peace between Spain and her former
colonies and which the United States was fostering, 3hould be Icnown.
Another troublesome spot in the '/est Indies was Haiti. This
former colony of France had gaiiied its independence through a 3lavc
insurrection. France had recognized its independence in return for
special commercial favors. The Haitians had set up a negro republic
in which no office could be held by a white man.
The United States had not recognized the independence of Haiti.
The Spanish American republics, although they had emancipated all
slaves within their ovm borders, had not recognized the independence
of Haiti but some of them were considering the matter.
Origin and Purpose of the Congress.
The idea of a congress of the newly revolted Spanish American
states to discuss plans of political union was under consideration
as early as 1810 when Chile broached the subject to Buenos Aires.
The latter thought the idea impracticable. (1)
Simon Bolivar, the Liberator, dreamed of a great confederation
of all the Spanish American states. As early as September 1815 he
wrote, "How beautiful it would be if the Isthmus of Panama should
become for us what the Isthmus of Corinth was for the Greeks! Would
to Cod that we may have the fortune some day of holding there some
august congress of the representatives of the republics, kingdoms,
and empires of America to deliberate upon the high interests of
peace and of war." (2)
(1) Loekey, J. B. Pan-Americanism, It s Beginnings , p. 23 5
(2) Ibid. p. 289 - citing from Cartas de Bolivar. Sociedad de
~ Udieiones, 145-50.

Bolivar believed that thi3 confederation would need the protection
of a powerful nation. His thoughts turned to a protective alliance
with Great Britain in which the latter country would shield the weak
American states from the attach of their enemies. But, as we shall
see, Great Britain refused to enter into such a protective alliance.
Bolivar never thought of forming such an alliance with the United
States of America nor did he invite her to be present at the Congress
of Panama.
The objects which the Spanish Americans hoped to attain through
the Congress of Panama may be seen in a dispatch which the Colombian
government sent, in March 1825, to its representative in Buenos Aires,
stating the objects of the congress and asking that they be brought
to the notice of the officials of the latter country. (1)
These objects included the formation of a defensive confederacy
against Spain and the consideration of such questions as attacks
upon Cuba and Porto Rico, the status of Haiti, controversial points
in international lav;, and the "means of giving effect to the declara-
tions of the President of the United States of America in his message
to the Congress of last year. 11 (2)
This list of objects was almost identical with one that appeared
in February 1825 in the "Gaceta de Colombia". This paper "though not
an official government organ, was at least friendly to the adminis-
tration and responded to the desires of Vice-President Santander. He
often spoke of it as T our gazette' and according to his own statements
frequently wrote articles for publication in its columns." (3)
(1) Lockey, J. 3. - Pan-Americanism, Its Beginnings, p. 321
(2) Ibid , p. 321 - citing from British a Foreign State Papers, XII, 894
(3) Ibid , p. 241 - citing from O'Leary, lienorias III, 105, 111, 124, 137
*
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This article in tho Gacota de Colombia v/uo copied by newspapers
in tlio United Stater, and Was therefore known to the various statesmen
interested in the Congress of Panama. (1) It was mentioned by Ilayne
,
in his speech in the Senate, during the Panama Congress debate.
e Invita '.lour:. jic Congress
.
In December 1324 Bolivar sent a circular letter to all the Spanish
American republics Inviting them to send delegates to an "Assembly of
Plenipotentiaries" to be held at Panama • (2) Colombia, Mexico, Central
America and Peru accepted. Bolivia and Chile finally accepted but too
late to take part in the deliberations.
Brazil, as a neutral South American state, was also invited. She,
too, accepted but failed to send a delegate.
An invitation to France was given, late in 1825, through the
Colombian agent in Paris. (3)
A few months before this time France had seemed distinctly in-
terested in affairs in the Western Hemisphere. She had had a large
fleet in West Indian waters, near Cuba. Its appearance off the Colom-
bian coast had caused that country to become panicky from fear of a
French attack. However, upon certain representations by the United
States as to its attitude toward Cuba, the French withdrew without
any aggressive act.
This episode would lead, one to believe that France would be
sufficiently interested in the doings of Spanish America to wish to
be represented at the Congress of Panama. But such was not the case.
France did not accept and acted with indifference towards the proposal.
An invitation was extended through the Colombian minister at
London to Great Britain.
(1) Loekey, J. B. - Pan-Americanism, Its Beginnings, p. 322
(2) Ibid. p. 312
(3) Arragon, Reginald, F. - The Congress of Panama , p. 305
(
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George Canning, the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs had
given this Matter much thought • In June 1025 he v/rote to Liverpool
that he had been "reflecting a good while on the difficulty in which
we arc lilcely to "be placed by the intended Congress of American States -
more especially if, as is not improbable, the United States of ITorth
America are invited to send a deputy to it. Shall we 3end a minister
there if invited or uninvited, or shall we take no notice of it.
Either is embarrassing; but I incline to think the last, though the
easiest - the most dangerous course of conduct. Yet, if we send, to
what specific purpose?"(l)
The British government finally did .accept the invitation to the
Congress of Panama and Edward J. Dawkins was appointed as a commis-
sioner ( not a minister-plenipotentiary) to act as an observer of
the meetings of the Congress but not to talce part in its del iberat ions.
He was to give advice to the Latin Americans when they desired it or
seemed to need it. With Dawkins there was also appointed a secretary
and four assistants. (2)
Holland sent Col. Van Veer to represent her at the Congress of
Panama. (5)
So far as can be learned from the Dutch archives and those of
Spanish America, Holland received no invitation to be present at
the congress. (4)
During the Napoleonic period, a lucrative contraband trade
had sprung up between the Dutch and the Spanish American colonies
and now that these colonies had become independent nations, Holland
wished to retain this trade.
(1) Arragon, R. P. - The Congre ss of Panama p. 298; citing from
Staple ton, A. G. Some Official Correspondence
of George Canning, Vol. "I. 275-^
(2) Ibid, p. _299
(3) Locice'y, J. B. - Pan-Americanism, Its Beginnings
, p. 313
(4) Arragon, R. P. - The Congress' of Panama, p. 306
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Also, at tliis time, the Dutch seemed to be imitators of the
English. When G-reat Britain recognized the new republics of America,
Holland followed suit. Now that Great Britain was sending an unof-
ficial delegate to the Congress of Panama, Holland al30 sent one.
Thus we find Col. Van Veer in Panama in July 1826 as an unofficial
observer of the proceedings of the congress and letting the Spanish
American republics know that Holland was sympathetically interested
in their welfare. (1)
The invitation to the United States to attend the Congress of
Panama came through the governments of Colombia, Mexico and Central
America and 210 1 directly from Bolivar.
The real object which the Spanish Americans had in view in in-
viting the United States to the congress was to obtain from the latter
government a clear statement of what was meant by llonroe's declaration
of December 1823. Did the United States intend to aid the Spanish
American states in case they were attacked by a European power? Perhaps,
too, there was some expectation on the part of the newly liberated re-
publics of "translating the Monroe Doctrine into a more definite en-
gagement." (2)
In fact Colombia was already placing the Ilonroe Doctrine on the
"program for the Congress of Panama and v;as making it the occasion for
the attendance of the United States." (3)
The first hint that the presence of the United States was desired
at the Congress was given orally in April 1325 by the ministers of Colom-
bia and Mexico as a sort of feeler to ascertain if a formal invitation
would be acceptable.
(1) Arragon, R. F. - The Congress of Panama
,
p. 306
(2) Perkins, Dexter - The Monro e Doctrine, 1823-1826. p. 205
(3) Arragon, R. P. - The Congres s of Panama, p. 371

Henry Clay, the Secretary of State, was enthusiastic over the
prospect of the oottgress. He saw in it the "completion of his American
system." (1) President Adams was much les3 entJiusia3tic . He saw that
the United States and Latin America were very much unlike each other
in many ways. Still, it seemed to hiln that participation in the congress
by the United States would show a spirit of cordiality and good will
toward the new republics "but he felt that more should he known of the
objects of the congress, its method of organization etc., before the
United States could consent to participate in it. (2)
Accordingly, Slay let the ministers of Colombia and Mexico know
that the administration looked favorably on the idea of the congress
but wished to have more definite knowledge concerning the subjects to
be discussed, the powers to be given to the diplomatic representatives
and the kind of organisation and methods of procedure under which the
congress was to deliberate.
Finally in Ilovember 1325 formal invitations to attend the Congress
of Panama were received by the United States from the governments of
Colombia, Lexico and also Central America. These invitations enumerated,
though not very specifically, the subjects to be discussed at the meet-
ings. Nothing was said about the powers with which the delegates were
to be invested or of the methods of procedure and mariner of organiza-
tion of the congress. (3)
Despite these discrepancies in the invitations the administration
accepted them and let the Spanish American states know that commissioners
from the United States would be sent, subject to the consent of the Senate,
(1) Turner, F. J. - Rise o f the Hew Vfest. p. 280
(2) Adams, J. Q. - Memoirs . Vol. VI. 531-536.
(3) Burgess, J. W. - The Hi
d
dle Period . 1817-1858. p. 148; also
Gales & Seaton's Uegister" or DebaTes ij^Congress - 1326, Vol. II
Appendix
,
pp . 44-46
.
**
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The first delegate chosen by the administration was Richard C.
Anderson of Kentucky, who, at the time of the invitations to the Congress
of Panama, was the United States minister to Colombia. He cane of a
well-ldiown Kentucky family. His father had been an officer in the Revo-
lution. His mother was a sister of George Rogers Clark. His brother,
Robert Anderson, was to be, in later years, the defender of Fort Sumter.
In his earlier years, Hi chard C Anderson had been a member of the legis-
lature of Kentuolcy and, a little later, a Congressman. While in the
latter position he showed sympathy with the struggles towards independence
of the Spanish American states said urged their recognition by the United
States. He had been ap])ointed minister to Colombia in 1823 by President
Monroe. (1)
When President Adams proposed to Mr, Anderson that lie attend the
projected Congress at Panama the latter accepted immediately.
Secretary Clay desired very much to have Albert Gallatin named as
Anderson's colleague at the congress and communicated with him with re-
gard to the matter. But MT. Gallatin refused the post for fear of
danger to his health from the climate of Panama and because of a lack
of knowledge of the Spanish language. (2)
John Sergeant of Pennsylvania, a friend of President Adams, was
then named for the position. MT. Sergeant had represented Pennsylvania,
in the Congress of the United States from 1815 to 1823. In 1832 he
ran as vice-president on the same ticket with Clay in the latter 's
campaign against Jackson. Later, we again find him in Congress from
1827 to 1829 and from 1837 to 1842. (3).
Sergeant willingly accepted the appointment to represent the united
States at the Congress of Panama.
(1) Dictionary of American Biography.
(2) Arragon, R. F. - rfhe Congress of Panama, p. 374
(3) Encyclopedic Dictionary of American Reference.
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V/illiam B. Rochester a "member of the seventeenth Congress and a
New York Circuit Judge" (1) WEB named as Secretary to the United States
delegates and accepted the appointment.
Sreat Pa-it:', in iuu 1 l.he Co. : of ' an:iri;i .
i
The objects which, apparently, Great Britain hoped to gain by
attendance at the Congress of Panama may be stated a3 follows: —the
maintenance of the predominant position which she held in Spanish
American affairs; the lessening of the influence of the United States
in Spanish America; the bringing about of peace between the new repub-
lics and Spain on terms suggested ^y Great Britain and through her
good offices.
In the formal records of the Congress of Panama, Great Britain
is mentioned only twice. On July 23, 1826, after the credentials of
Dawkins had been examined it was resolved that a letter of ae3mowledg-
ment be sent to Canning and another to Dawkins. July 15, 1826 it was
recorded that LIr. Dawkrins be informed of the decision of the Congress
to adjourn to Tacubaya. (2)
To find accounts of the aims and actions of the British with re-
gard to the Congress of Panama we must look at the correspondence of
Canning, of Dawkins, and the unofficial correspondence of the delegates
to the congress.
Bolivar had dreamed of a protective alliance with Great Britain.
But Canning refused to entertain thoughts of such an alliance with the
Spanish American states. Santander, the Colombian vice-president, in
f writing to Bolivar under date of Pec ember 23, 1826 of Canning's atti-
tude in this matter said the latter feared " that the other nations
may view illy this league and particularly the United States of the
North. He declared that England aspired only to maintain with the
(1) Arragon, R. F. - The Congress of Panama, p. 375
(2) Lockey, J. B. - Pan-Americanism
,
Its Beginnings , pp. 371-2.
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American States the relations which she has established unless some
unforeseen events oblige her to take another course." (1)
So Daw3cins received no directions to form an alliance with the
Spanish American states. Canning in his instructions to DawJcins,
given Harch 10, 1G2G, said, "His Majesty has no other object than to
obtain the most regular and correct information of its proceedings
and to assure the American States collectively of the friendly senti-
ment and the lively interest in their welfare and tranquility, which
His l.Iajesty has repeatedly expressed." (2)
Ilr. Arragon, who has made a scholarly study of the matter says,
"Observation and expression of good will alone would not have justified
the dispatch of an agent and two secretaries to distant and insalu-
brious Panama." (3)
Further on in his instructions, Canning states that Dawl-rins was
to make clear to the various delegates, in an informal way, "that the
principles of maritime Lav/ to be adopted by the new States may be those
whieh Great Britain has always contended to be the true principles
growing out of long established usage and of prescriptive authority
in the Old \7orld; upon which Great Britain has uniformly acted and
of which she has as uniformly respected the exercise by others and
by none more than by the Mew States of America, themselves. And you
will take care to have it duly understood that our determination to
act upon these principles, as it has not been shaken by European Con-
federacies, so it will not be altered by any Resolution or combinations
» of the States of the lew World." (4)
The article in the G-aeeta de Colombia, listing the subjects Colom-
bia, wished to have discussed in the congress had been published in
(1) Arragon, R. F. The Congress of Panama p. 295, quoting from O'Leary,
I.Iemorias Vol. III. 341"
(2) Ibid , p. 299, auoting from the archives of the Foreign Office 97 Vol. 115
(3) lb id . p. 300.
(4) Ibid , p. 301, auoting Canning to Dawkins, Foreign Office 97, Vol. 115
(
1 9
February 1826 and the natter of the "righto of nations, which are
of a controversial nature" (1) was among them. This, perhaps, accounts
for Canning 1 a statement as given above.
Also, in this connection, it is interesting to note that, in the
following December, President Adams, in his special message to the
Senate mentioned "The doctrine that free ships mahe free goods and
the restrictions of reason upon the extent of blockades" (2) as sub-
jects which might properly be discussed at the congress.
Again, in his instructions to Dawhins Canning said that he wished
to be informed as to how the new republics felt, "toward each other
and the degree of influence in their careers v/hich they may appear to
allow to the United States of North America. You will understand that
to a league among the states, lately colonies of Spain, limited to
objects growing out of their common relations to Spain, His Ilajesty's
Government would not object but, any project for putting the United
States of ITorth America at the head of an American Confederacy as
against Europe would be felt as an ill return for the service which
has been rendered to those States and the dangers which have been
averted from them, by the countenance and friendship and publich
declaration of Great Britain and it would too, probably, 3.t no very
distant period endanger the peace of both America and Europe." (3)
An attempt to lessen the influence of the United States in
Spanish America by the government of Great Britain can be seen in
the question of Cuba. It is certain that Great Britain had wished
it to see Cuba remain in the hands of Spain. It is a fact that Canning,
on April 2, 1824, before his government had recognized the independence
(1) loclcey, J. B. Pan-Americanism, Its Beginnings p. 321, quoting
British Cz Foreign State Papers, XII, 894.
(2) Richardson, J. P. - Messages and Papers of the Presidents , p. 519
(3) Pemperley, W.H.7. - Phe Later American Policy of George Canning , in
American history KevTewPTXl, VB7."citing
Public Record Office, Foreign Office, Colombia 50.
<
of the American republics and because of his strong desire to have it
do so, had informed Ferdinand of Spain that if the latter would recognize
the new American republics, the British government would guarantee Cuba
to Spain. (1) lie wished Great Britain to recognize the new states and
lie believed recognition by Spain would hasten this procedure. So he
used Cuba as a bait.
But, the countries which, in 1826, were most lively to lead an
attack upon Cuba were Colombia and Mexico. Yet Canning wrote in his
instructions to Dawkins, "The British Government is so far from denying
the right of the new states to make an hostile attack upon Cuba - - that
we have uniformly refused to join With the United States in - - remon-
strating against the supposed intention or intimating that we should
feel displeasure at the execution of it. We should, indeed, regret it,
but we arrogate to ourselves no right to control the operations of one
belligerent against another. The Government of the United States now
professes itself of a different opinion. 11 (2)
Perkins, in his special study of the Monroe Doctrine of this period
says, "Certainly no words could have been more cunningly calculated to
widen the rift between the new republics and the United States." (3)
The British agent, Dawkins , reached Panama on June 2, 1826. He
never took part in the deliberations of the congress but had frequent
private conversations with the various delegates. From the correspondence
of Dawkins and that of the delegates to the congress we can learn some-
thing of the subjects discussed in these conferences.
Among other things, Dawkins upheld the sincerity of his government
in its attempts to mediate between the Spanish American republics and
Spain by contradicting the statement of Alexander E. Everett, the United
(1) Perkins, D. - The Ilonroe Do ctrine 1825-1826 p. 249, citing from
Canning"' s d'isDatch , L~ondon , Public Record Office,
Foreign Office, Spain. Vol. 284 ITo . 14 Apr. 2, 1824.
(2) Ibid , p. 251, quoting from London, Public Record Office, Foreign
Office Colombia, Vol. 50, Mar. 18, 1826.
(3) Ibid , p. 251.
*
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States minister to Spain who had claimed that England had made no
formal attempt at mediation since she had recognized the new republics.
Dawkins produced copies of dispatches to prove the sincerity of Great
Britain in this matter. Mr. CVual, a Colombian delegate who had begun
to show a coolness towards the English was completely won over by
Dawkins and spoke of "the imprudence of the United States, of the
errors committed by Mr; Everett, and of the mischief which may be done
by the indiscreet publication of his correspondence." (1)
Thus Dawkins, in a dispatch to Canning was able to say, "The general
influence of the United States is not, in my opinion, to be feared.
It certainly exists in Colombia, but it has been very much weakened
even there by their protests against an attack on Cuba and by the in-
discretions they have committed at Madrid." (2)
However, the greatest efforts of Dawkins at Panama were expended
in an effort to increase the prestige and the predominant position
which Great Britain held in Spanish America. The best way to do this
was to give the new nations what they needed and desired most, that
is, peace. (3) But this happ3r outcome he would like to have seen ac-
complished according to methods favored by the British. So he sug-
gested to the various delegates that Spanish America might bring
Ferdinand of Spain to terms if it offered a money payment -by way of
reimbursing Spain for the loss of her colonies. He offered the ser-
vices of his government as the mediator in such a proposal.
Host of the Spanish Americans, however, were opposed to this
method of acquiring recognition from Spain. Also, they wished the
first step towards peace to be taken by the latter country.
(1) Temperley, H.W. V. The Later American Policy of George Canning
,
American Hi story Review X I , "789
.
(2) I^JAl 793 » citing Public Record Office, Foreign Office, Colombia 36
(3) Lockey, J. B. - Pan-Americanism, Its Beginnings p. 371
*
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The United States, too, was opposed to any money payment by
the new republics. Clay, in his instructions to tlio delegates from
the United States said, "ITor would their honor or national pride
allow them to entertain or deliberate on propositions founded upon
the notion of purchasing, with a pecuniary consideration, the Spanish
aclcnowledgment of their independence." (1)
However, Dawkins persisted in urging this idea to such an extent
that certain of the Spanish American Delegates "believed it to he
the main object of his visit to Panama. (2)
With regard to this matter, Ilendez, one of the Colombian delegates,
after the adjournment of the congress wrote; "The English commissioner
in Panama never ceased preaching to us about the necessity of granting
an indemnity to Spain as a s ine qua non of recognition. After the
assembly had adjourned he suggested that Mr. Canning would be very
much displeased to know that we had made no proposal of peace to
Spain, and that this would be viewed in Europe as proof that we were
for settling everything by force and thus following the footsteps
of the French republic." (3)
But Dawlcins' s attempts to induce the new republics to make peace
by the payment of an indemnity were cut short by the adjournment of
the congress to Tacubaya. Dawlcins was disappointed in this adjourn-
ment and did not enter Mexico to be present at it.
In general, then, it may be said that Canning, at the time of
the Congress of Panama, was actuated by jealousy and distrust of the
United States. On this point Perkins says of Canning, "He was ner-
vously anxious over the possibility of a general trans-atlantic league
t 1 ) Hiles 1 weekly Register. Vol. XXXVI. p. 73
(2) Lockey, J. B. * Pan-Americanism
,
Its Beginnings, p. 37 5
(3) Ibid , p. 373, citing O'Leary, Ileraorias
,
VIII, 215 - Hendez to Bolivar.
«
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of the governments of the New World of which the United States would
have the sole direction. Ilia jealousy of the /onerlean government is
"beyond question." (1)
Also, it is certain that Dawkins's efforts to initiate peace ne-
gotiations between the new republics and Spain on the "basis of a mone-
tary compensation were unsuccessful. It is also doubtful if he were
successful in his attempts to lessen, in general, the influence of the
United States in Spanish America. Dawkins's greatest success, un-
doubtedly lay in preserving the cordiality existing between Great
Britain and Spanish America.
The general attitude of Great Britain toward the assembly of
American states at Panama is well summed up in the following words of
Mr. Arragon :— "Canning did not care to challenge the Continental
powers and the United States nor to alarm the new republics by a
readiness to accept a protectorate or even exclusive treaty privileges
in Spanish America. In view of the predominance of British trade,
capital a' d influence, there was no need to do so. On the other hand,
he would not allow a privileged status to be gained by the United States
nor a continental system to be created which would treat England as
alien to the lew World. 1' (2)
Political Conditions in the United States in 1825 .
To understand the attitude taken by the Congress of the United
States towards Adams's proposal to send delegates to the Congress of
Panama, it is necessary to glance at the political conditions that
existed in the United States in 1825 and 1826.
The presidential election of November 1824 had been indecisive,
i. e., no one of the four candidates had received a majority of the
electoral votes. Therefore the names of the three leading candidates
(1) Perkins, D. - The Ilonroe Doctrine 1825-1826 p. 250
(2) Arragon, R. F. - The Congres s ~oT Panama
.
p. 303
*
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( Jackson, Adams, and Crawford) were sent to the House of Representatives
and that body selected Adams as the next president.
Thereupon the adherents of Jackson set up a great cry that fraud
and injustice had "been worked. They declared that their candidate, who
had received the largest proportion of electoral votes (though not a
majority of them) had been cheated out of the presidency; that Adams
had gained the office through collusion with Clay, who had been the
fourth candidate in the campaign. This cry became all the louder when
Adams, upon assuming the presidency, nominated Clay as his Secretary
of State.
The elements opposed to Adams were so bitter that they seemed de-
termined to do all in their power to discredit him and to prevent the
accomplishment of any constructive program which he might set forth.
This attitude of opposition can be seen in more than one episode from
1825 to 1829 but it was first strongly shown in the case of the Congress
of Panama.
The United States and the Congress of Panama.
i m - - .
In his annual message to Congress on December 6, 1325, President
John Quincy Adams referred briefly to a congress to be held at Panama
stating that "the invitation has been accepted and ministers on part
of the United States will be commissioned to attend at those delibera-
tions and to take part in them so far as may be compatible with neu-
trality. » (1)
The matter was not taken up again by the President until December
twenty-sixth. The reason for the delay was the fact that the Senate
was hesitating with regard to the confirmation of Rufus King, the
President's choice for the post of minister to London and Henry Clay,
the Secretary of State, thought it would be well to delay the presenta-
tion of the names of the delegates to the Congress of Panama until
(1) Richardson, J. D. - Lessages and Papers of the Preside^ Vol. II p. 302
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Kind's appointment had been confirmed. In thin way two woc3:s v/cro
lost, (i) TfreT^TiaTaa Minion \t\ the I (.3. Sgjaatg
On December 26, 1025, President Adams delivered a special message
to the Senate on the subject of the participation by the United States
in the Congress of Panama and he submitted the names of the delegates
for the confirmation of the Senate.
According to this message it was not the intention of the United
States to talce part in any deliberations of a belligerent kind, nor
to contract any alliances, nor to engage in any activities hostile to
other nations.
Measures in which the United States might well talce part were
the consideration of "principles of liberal commercial intercourse";
the discussion of maritime neutrality and blockade and the establishment,
if possible, of the "doctrine that free ships raa-:e free goods."
The meeting would be a splendid opportunity to give proof of our
good will to all the new republics to the south of us.
/mother topic suggested for discussion was the advancement of re-
ligious liberty.
With regard to the Monroe Doctrine it was said, "An agreement be-
tween all the parties represented at the meeting, that each will guard
by its own means against the establishment of any future European colony
within its borders may be found advisable."
The problem of Cuba, while not mentioned by name, was introduced
into the message in such a way that all familiar with the policy of the
administration in this matter, understood what was meant.
Anderson and Sergeant were proposed for the positions of "Envoys
Extraordinary and Ministers Plenipotentiary to the Assembly of American
nations at Panama." William B. Rochester was named as secretary of the
delegation. (2)
(1) Arragon, R. p. The Congress of panama p. 461
(2) Richardson, J. D. lie s sages and Papers' of ""the Presidents Vol.11, 318-
<
10.
Accompanying the message were copies of the correspondence with
the ministers of Colombia, L'exico and Central America.
The matter was then given into the hands of the Senate's Foreign
Relations Committee for study and report. This committee contained
one stanch friend of Adams, Mills of Massachusetts . All the other
members were opponents of the administrat ion. It had been charged
that the committee had been "pacJced" by Vice-President, John C. Calhoun.
However that may be, it is certain that it fell to Calhoun to fill
three vacancies in the committee and all three were anti-administration
men. (1)
On January 9, 1826 in answer to a request of the Senate, Adams
sent to that body translations of the conventions which. Colombia had
entered into with Peru, Kexico and Central America and those parts of
the correspondence between the United States and Russia, France,
Colombia and Mexico that were concerned with Latin American affairs.
All these papers were reported to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
Apparent discrepancies were found by the senators on the committee
between the items mentioned in the President T s message of Peceriber
twenty-sixth and the aims of the Spanish American states. Thus the
committee found that Colombia thought the Monroe Poctrine should be
enforced Irby the joint and united efforts of all the states to be
represented in the Congress Who should be bound by a solemn convention
to secure this end.' 1 (2)
The opposition senators considered as the objects of the congress,
those suggested by Spanish America rather than "the propositions the
United States was willing to discuss in the purely consultative body
which Adams and Clay had in mind." (3)
(1) Arragon, R. F. The Congress of Panama p. 476, citing Calhoun,
•Jorks, Vol. VI, 346. al s
o
Yalliams, Edwin - Statesmen's Ilanual IT Y 1854- p. 656
(2) Benton, T. H. - ThlFEyTears f Vlew'Tol. I. 68
(3) Turner, F. J. - Pa s e ~oT~EKe~lre\r j7es t . p. 280
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The fact that the assembly at Panama was to consist of belligerents
ajid neutralr. and that the delegates from the latter states were to act
merely as observers when belligerent actions were under consideration,
carried little weight with the committee, (1) which finally reported
adversely on the proposition.
In this adverse report the committee answered Adams's message step
by step and drew upon all possible arguments against participation in
the Congress of Panama by the United States. This report was rendered
by Senator Macon and ended with the recommendation that the following
resolution be adopted by the Senate :-- "Resolved, that it is not expedient,
at this time, for the United States to send ministers to the Congress of
American Nations assembled at Panama." (2)
But certain senators who were opposed to the Administration did not
even wait for the report of the foreign Relations Committee before be-
ginning their attack. Shortly after the President's message of December
26, 1825 had been delivered and while the matter of the Panama mission
was still in the hands of the committee, Senator Branch of ITorth Carolina
introduced a resolution into the Senate which charged the President with
having exceeded hrs powers. Many of the senators had been angry at the
dictatorial way in which President Adams, in his annual message of
December sixth had said that, "ministers will be commissioned" without
mentioning consultation with the Senate. They apparently overlooked the
fact that in his message of December twenty-sixth, the President had
asked the advice and consent of the Senate in this matter.
In his Memoirs under date of December 31, 1825 President Adams
says, "Hills gave me a printed copy of the resolution offered by
Mr. Branch to the Senate declaring that the President of the United
States has no right or power to appoint Ambassadors or public Ministers
but with the advice and consent of the Senate except in cases of vacancy
(1)Lockey, J. B. - Pan-Amer i
c
ani sm , Its Beginnings pp. 322-23
(2) Gales & Seaton's Register 18*26, "column 152.
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which may happen during the recess of the Senate. It is preceded by
a 'Whereas, the President of the United States, did, "by his message
at the commencement of the Senate, assert that Ministers would be
commissioned to Panama without submitting them to the Senate and
whereas, though he did submit them to the Senate he yet maintained
the right of sending them without concurrence of the Senate; there-
fore, to guard against the precedent, Resolved' etc. I told Kills
that the preamble or whereas, upon which the resolution was founded,
was a statement incorrect in point of fact, charging me with having
asserted that which I never did assert. I said I considered the
Executive competent to institute a new mission and appoint members
during the recess of the Senate but that when the Senate were in
session, they must be nominated. " (1)
Then again under date of January 2, 1826 Adams says, "Mr. Lloyd
said the resolution was not drawn up by Mr. Branch who was a mere tool
in the hands of another man behind the curtain It proceeded un-
doubtedly from a disposition unfriendly to me; but perhaps the posi-
tive manner in which I had expressed myself had given some handle to
the construction which the resolution gave to my words." (2)
However, nothing ever came of this resolution. Mr. Branch was
frequently absent from Senate meetings owing to home troubles and
was not able to push it through. On April 27, 1826, Senator Branch's
motion was laid on the table by a vote of 23 to 21. (3)
Although the Foreign Relations Committee had made its report on
£ January sixteenth, the consideration of its resolution was postponed
until February first, on which day the President sent to the Senate,
in answer to its request, selected parts of the correspondence between
(1) Adams, J. Q. - Memoirs Vol. VII, 96
(2) Ibid;, p. 99
"
(3) Irragon, R. F. - The Congress of Panama p. 407
i
the United States and Spain with regard to the proponed mediation of
Russia in an attempt to bring about peace between Spain and her former
American colonics. (1)
No other action was taken until February 15, 1826 when Senator
Van Bur en, the leader of the opposition, moved that the question as
to whether the United States should send ministers to the Congress of
Panama be debated in public, unless the publication of such documents
as it would be necessary to refer to would be prejudicial to negotiations
then being carried on and that the President be asked if such objection
existed and if so, to name the documents.
Adams replied that all the documents referring to the Congress of
Panama had been sent by him in confidence, in accordance with the usages
of the Senate and he believed in maintaining this custom of "free confi-
dential intercourse" (2) between the Senate and the President but he
left it to the Senate to decide for itself if it wished to depart from
this custom.
This reply angered the Senators greatly but on February 23, 1326
it was finally decided to debate the question of the Congress of Panama
in executive session.
Although the debate was carried on in private, the speeches were
given to the public through various sources. Thus Gales and Seaton T s
Register for 1326 reports several of the speeches and Benton, in his
"Abridgment of the Debates in Congress" summarizes many of them. Some
were published as pamphlets as e. g. , those of Hayne, Benton, White,
Holmes, Johnston (Louisiana) and Y/oodbury. (3) Besides those just
mentioned, Gales and Seaton's Register also contains the speeches of
Van Bur en, Berries, Diekerson, and Robbins. The Register did not
(1) Hiles 1 Weekly Register Vol. XXX April 15, 1826 p. 105
(2) Adams, J. Q. - Kemoirs Vol. VII, 1.26
(3) Arragon, R. P. - TEe congress of Panama
,
note to p. 394.
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report Senator Randolph's speech. In connection with this senator
it says in one place, "Mr. Randolph here too]; part in the debate.
His speech on this question was never reported by himself and, in
secret session, it is known, no reporters are allowed." (1)
The report of the Committee on Foreign Relations was a mine
from which the opposition senators drew their objections to the
Panama mission. The outstanding objections to participation in the
congress, advanced by the senators, may be grouped as follows:--
fear of the violation of the position of neutrality which the United
States was maintaining; anxiety that the participation in the Congress
might lead to the entrance of the United States into entangling al-
liances; doubts as to the far-reaching interpretations of the llonroe
Doctrine that were being expressed; the slavery question; the lack
of a clear statement by Spanish America as to the organization of the
congress, the mode of procedure to be followed and the powers to be
granted to the delegates and finally the impropriety of interfering
in the religious customs of other nations.
The first three points enumerated above are closely related but
for convenience we shall discuss them separately.
In his message of December 26, 1825 President Adams had distinctly
stated that the neutrality of the United States was in no way to be
violated by attendance at the Congress of Panama. He said, "The in-
vitation has been accepted and ministers on the part of the United
States will be commissioned to attend at their deliberations and to
to take part in them so far as may be compatible with that neutrality
from which it is neither our intention nor the desire of the other
American states that we should depart." (2)
(1) Gales and Seaton's Regi ster 182G - column 263
(2) Richardson, J. D. lies sages "and Papers of the Presidents Vol. II, 330

Also, it had been decided that two clasr.es of questions v/ere to
"be di30U3sed at the congress : --those concerning the progress of the
war "between Spanish American countries and Spain i. c., belligerent
g questions and those in which all the nations assembled,
including
neutrals, might ta3:e part. (1) V/hcn plans of aggression towards
Spain v/ere to be discussed, the United States was to act the part
merely of an observer.
However, some senators expressed fear that the neutrality of
the United States waa to be endangered. It was stated that mere at-
tendance at an assembly in which belligerent actions against another
power v/ere discussed, was sufficient to place the neutrality of the
United States in jeopardy. On this point Benton, in his "Thirty
Years' View" says "We v/ere at peace with Spain and could not go into
any such council without compromising our neutrality and impairing
the integrity of our national character." (2)
That President Adams had no thought of engaging the United States
in entangling alliances as a result of attendance at the Congress of
Panama is seen from the fact that he looked upon the congress as a
diplomatic assembly in which problems common to all the nations repre-
sented v/ere to be discussed. As Adams expressed it, the representatives
of the various nations v/ere !Ito deliberate upon objects important to
the welfare of all." (3) He did not wish the United States to become
subservient to any super-government or amphictyonic council which was
to control the affairs of the entire continent.
But the opposing senators believed that the United States could
not take part in such a congress as that proposed for Panama without
finally entering into alliances with Spanish America and that these
(1) G-ales & Seaton T s Kegister 1826 - Appendix p. 45, Salazar to Clay.
(2) Benton, T. II. - "Thirty Years' View " - Vol. I, p. 6 6
(5) Richardson, J
.
D. - I.Iessages & Tapers of the Presidents Vol. II, 331

alliances would load to the violation of our neutrality.
Washington's warning against entangling alliances was quoted
by thorn. Adams himself answered thlfl objection a little later on in
his message to the House of Representatives. He stated that 7/nshington T s
advice applied only to European entanglements; that in Y/ashington f s day
the United States was the only independent nation in the 7/estern Hemi-
sphere; that since then many new republics had sprung into existence
in America and Y/ashington' s advice did not preclude friendly intercourse
and relations with these independent American states. (1)
The matter of the interpretation of the l.'onroe Doctrine aroused
violent discussions in the Senate. President Adams had made his position
on this subject clear in his special message to the Senate. (2)
However, the President's statement did not satisfy all the senators.
They were acquainted with Colombia's interpretation of the llonroe Doc-
trine. (3) Also, many senators, no doubt, were familiar with the arti-
cle published in the Gaceta de Colombia (4) and copied "by newspapers
in the United States in which the objects to be forwarded at the Con-
gress of Panama were stated. Among these was the following: -- !, To tal:e
into consideration the means of giving effect to the declarations of
the President of the United States of America, in his message to the
Congress of last year, with a view to frustrating any future idea of
colonization on this continent by the powers of Europe and to resist
any principle of interference in our internal affairs." (5)
lloreover, the Senate had before it for study, the formal invi-
tations which the ministers of Colombia, Mexico and Central America
had transmitted to the Secretary of State and these invitations showed
(1) Richardson, J. D. lies sages & Papers o f the Presidents Vol. II, 337
(2) See page 18, above.
(3) See page 19, above.
(4) See page 4, above.
(5) loekey, J. B. - Pan-Americanism, Its Beginnings p. 321, citing
from j-jritish and Poreign afa?Ee~~?apers XII, 894

"that the governments which sent them hoped to uoe the non-colonization
principle (i.e., of the I'onroe Doctrine) to form a more intimate connec-
tion with the United States." (1) Thus the invitation which the Colombian
minister presented to the Secretary of State 3ays, "The manner in which
all colonization of European powers on the American continent shall "be
resisted and their interference in the present contest between Spain
and her former colonies prevented are other points of great interest." (2)
The opposition made much of the indiscreet words of Poinsett, the
United States minister to Mexico who, in September 1825, concerning the
newly liberated republics had said, "The United States had pledged them-
selves not to permit any other power to interfere either with their in-
dependence or form of government." (3)
Secretary Clay, also, in November 1825 had written of "the memorable
pledge" of 1823. (4) New the Secretary explained that this use of the
word "pledge" did not mean that the United States was to engage in war
merely because Spanish America was attacked. (5)
But the senators were unconvinced. With such statements as the
above in mind it can be seen how certain senators based a tremendous
opposition to the Congress of Panama on the fact that it would bring-
forth new and far-reaching interpretations of the Monroe Doctrine which
would be certain to lead us into entangling alliances and violation of
our neutrality.
Host of the senators, while praising Monroe 1 s words of 1823, be-
lieved they were uttered merely for moral effect. They were unalterably
opposed to the United States acting as protector for the entire Western
Hemisphere or of embroiling itself in war for some Latin American state.
(1) Perkins, D. - The I.Ionroe Doctrine 1823-1826 p. 205
(2) Ibid, p. 206, citing from American State Papers, Foreign Relations Y,
p. 837.
(3) Ipjfl-» P- 209, citing American State Papers, Foreign Relations, V, p. 854
(4) ibid. p. 209.
(5) Ibid, d • 210.
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Senator V/oodbury of Hew Hampshire expressed the sentiment of the
opposition when he asked, "How many of our gallant sons are to find
ignoble graves under the tropical sun of Guatemala, if 3ome petty
Hessian Prince should hire a regiment of infantry to Spain!" (1)
When Adams, in his message of December twenty-sixth said he
wished to have a public declaration made by the nations assembled at
Panama that each would guard its own territory against future European
colonization he was urging "the translation of the principle which he
himself had evolved into a rule of American public law It certainly
involved no dangerous surrender of independence and no entangling al-
liances." (2)
But this procedure was not looked upon favorably by the opposition
senators. It was even said that the dignity of the United States was
lowered by such a declaration as the President suggested. As Perkins
says, "To take a pledge to other nations to preserve our own territory
inviolate was to Hayne, to White of Tennessee and to Forsyth, nothing
short of 'degrading 1." (3)
It was on the question of slavery that the greatest outbursts of
oratory occurred. The opposition based its objections on this score
to the facts that the status of Haiti was to be discussed at the Con-
gress, that belligerent operations against Cuba were to be considered,
that the abolition of the slave trade was to be furthered, and to the
fact that the Spanish American republics had abolished slavery and had
raised negroes to positions of trust in the army and the state.
£ The spectacle of Haiti was ever before the minds of the slave-
holding senators. The pictures of the slave insurrection, of the mur-
dering of the masters, of the setting up of a negro republic in which
(1) Gales cb Seaton's Register 1826, col. 192
(2) Perkins, D. - The Honro e Doctrine 1323-1336
,
p. 207
(3) Ibid, p. 217.

all offices were closed to whites, v/cre frightful examples of what
might possibly happen in the South.
But Haiti had not been invited to attend the Congress of Panama.
Also, the administration was opposed to recognizing Haiti as an inde-
pendent state and we ]mow that, when instructions v/cre finally given
to the delegates from the United States, they were told to place the
weight of their influence in the congress against recognition. So
there was no difference in outlook between the administration and the
opposition on the Question of Haiti.
But the status of Haiti was a subject which the Spanish Americans
had declared to be suitable for discussion by both belligerents and
neutrals (1) and many of the senators from the South did not care to
have the United States represented where the subject of Haiti was even,
mentioned.
It is also true that both the administration and the opposition
regarded the question of Cuba with the same outlook. (2) Both were
opposed to Cuba passing from the hands of Spain into those of any other
nation. Both were opposed to seeing an independent negro republic set
up in the island. The administration had even requested Ilexico and
Colombia to suspend the pursuance of plans for an attack upon Cuba
until the outcome of the intervention of Russia with Spain in the in-
terests of peace should be 3mown.
On this point the historian Burgess says, "It is more probable
that one of the reasons which moved President Adams and Mr. Clay to
} urge attendance upon the congress was to be in a position to restrain
the Spanish American states from attempting to seize Cuba and Porto
Rico." (3)

But the opposition senators made a tremendous to-do on this sub-
ject. They pictured slave insurrections breaking out in Cuba a3 the
result of attacks by Spanish America and spreading thence with all
their terrors to the United States.
On the subject of Haiti they pictured negro ministers from that
republic residing at Washington and spreading discontent and the seeds
of insurrection aJBOng negroes to the south.
There were murmurs of dissent in the Senate because the subject
of the abolition of the African slave trade was to be discussed. Eut
the United States, as early as 1807, had passed a lav/ prohibiting the
importation of slaves from Africa. Also, in llonroe's administration,
the House of Representatives had passed a resolution looking toward
co-operation with other powers in an attempt to suppress this trade.
Some time thereafter a treaty with regard to this matter was drawn up
with Colombia but the Senate failed to ratify it. How Colombia would
like further discussion of the matter.
Finally there were strong objections from certain slaveholding
senators to the United States being represented in a congress where
negro delegates might be present. It was known that the Spanish Ameri
can states had abolished slavery and that negroes had equal chances
with the whites to rise to places of trust. Thus some were found in
high posts in the armies and governments of Spanish America. Could
delegates from a slaveholding nation sit in a conference with nations
which upheld such principles? The thought was unbearable to some.
Thus, by use of the arguments mentioned above, certain senators
hoped to raise up sentiment against the administration measure.
The criticism of the administration for failing to obtain from
the Spanish American governments clear statements of the methods of
organization of the congress, the modes of procedure to be used and
t
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the powers to bo granted to the delegates, was a just and very serious
one. The opposition claimed the United States had no right to engage
in a congress, the nature of v/hich was 30 vaguely set forth. It was
claimed that for this reason alone, if for no other, we should refuse
to participate in the congress.
As for the religious question it should be said that when Presi-
dent Adams, in his message to the Senate, suggested that "principles
of religious liberty be advanced" he meant only to secure religious
toleration for citizens of the United States residing in Spanish
America, (1) although agreements to this effect had already been
reached with some of the southern republics.
The opposition seized upon this topic and in glowing terms de-
creed interference in the internal affairs of other nations and es-
pecially along religious lines.
Senator Hayne of South Carolina made a long speech covering all
phases of the Panama Congress question. Extracts from his speech make
a good summarization of the stand taken by the opposition in this affair.
Hayne said in part, "From these documents, no man can deny that
the Congress of Panama is to be composed of deputies from belligerent
states and that its objects are essentially belligerent If the
character of the Congress is belligerent - no neutral can lawfully be
there A strict and honorable neutrality must keep us out of any
meeting not having peaceful objects exclusively The ignorance
in which we are left of the mode of the organization of the Congress,
its manner of proceeding and the form and substance of the powers of
the Representatives, should constitute a decisive inducement to ab-
stain from involving ourselves in such a measure Mr. Monroe T s
declaration, I repeat was intended to produce a moral effect abroad;
(1) President Adams explained his stand in his later message to
the House of Representatives.
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he designed it for the atmosphere of Europe .... it left forei,';n nations
under a vague impression of what we might do if the event alluded to
should ever happen On the slave question my opinion is this: I
consider our rights in that species of property as not even open to
discussion either here or elsewhere Let me solemnly declare, once
for all, that the Southern States never will permit and never can per-
mit any interference whatever in their domestic concerns and that the
very day on which the unhallowed attempt shall he made by the authori-
ties of the Federal Government, we will consider ourselves as driven
from the Union I abhor the idea of combinations among sovereign
states for any purpose whatever We can accomplish no good and
may involve ourselves in difficulties by counselling with those who are
merely to settle the mode of co-operation in the invasion of Cuba and
Porto Rico - a measure already decided on If it is against the
spirit of our Constitution to interfere in any way with the religion
of our own People, I should conclude it must be altogether foreign to
our policy to interfere with the religion of other nations T.7e
are about to violate the maxim of the Father of his Country which en-
joins us .... to cultivate .... entangling alliances with none." (1)
Most of the orators of the Senate were numbered among the op-
ponents of the Panama mission.
Among the administration friends who spolce in favor of the
mission were Bobbins of Rhode Island and Johnston of Louisiana. The
latter' s speech is noteworthy from the fact that he was from the South
and a slave holder.
He started out by refuting the claim that attendance at the con-
gress would lead to the violation of the neutrality of the United States.
The assembly was to be a "meeting of diplomatic agents .... to act
(1) Gales & Seaton's Register Vol. II 1826 columns 152-175
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ministerially." Even If a treaty were formed (which was moat unlikely)
it would have to "be sanctioned by the Senate before it became binding
on the United State3.
As to the Uonroe Doctrine, he said that that "memorable declara-
tion has had its effect." l.Ionroe's statement plus England's recogni-
tion of the new states had thwarted any intention the Holy Alliance
might have entertained of interfering in America.
Johnston T s remarks on the questions of Cuba, Haiti and the slave
trade were especially interesting. He stated that he represented a
state which, from its location, would be the first to feel the effect
of any disturbance in Cuba. He wished that island to retain its present
status and said, "It is our interest and our duty to keep Cuba as it is;
a movement there would be dangerous to us Let the United States
ministers go to Panama and remonstrate against an attack on Cuba, so
dangerous to us."
Neither was any change in our attitude towards Haiti desired.
Here too our ministers at Panama could "remonstrate against a measure
so offensive to us" as the recognition of Haiti by the Spanish American
states.
Of the African slave trade he declared, "This inhuman traffic
which fills the world with misery ought to be effectually suppressed.
"
This suppression would not interfere with slavery in the United States.
Also, ministers from the United States should be willing to discuss
this question as it was this country which, a year or so previously,
had first broached the matter to Colombia.
Before concluding, Mr. Johnston mentioned such subjects as those
relating to trade and international maritime law and strongly supported
the stand taken on these matters by the administration. (1)
(1) Gales and Seaton's Register Vol. II 1826, columns 218-234.

Of all the debaters In the Senate, John Randolph of Roanoke v/as
the most violent and vituperative. He Intimated that the invitations
to the Congress of Panama did not come from the Spanish American Re-
publics but were manufactured in the office of the Secretary of State. (1)
He spoke disparagingly of the alliance between the "Puritan and black-
leg." (a)
News of this speech v/as brought to the Secretary of State and the
outcome v/as a duel between Randolph and Clay. However, no blood was
shed and the two opponents shook hands and forgot the matter. Benton,
in writing' of this affair says, "It was about the last of the high-
toned duels that I have witnessed and among the highest-toned that I
have ever witnessed." (3)
In the manner indicated above the Senate debated from February 23
to March 14, 1826 on the expediency of the United States being repre-
sented at the Congress of Panama. The opponents of the Panama mission
had the oratory but the friends of the administration had the votes and
on March 14 were able to bring the matter to a conclusion. The resolu-
tion of the Committee on Foreign Relations that, "It is not expedient,
at this time, for the United States to send ministers to the Congress
of American Hat ions assembled at Panama" v/as defeated by a vote of
19 to 24. (4)
The nominations of the delegates Anderson and Sergeant were im-
mediately thereafter confirmed, Anderson by a vote of 27 to 17 and
Sergeant by one of 26 to 18. (5) Sergeant, no doubt, lost a vote
because of his well-known anti-slavery views. (6)
(1) Schouler, J. Hist, of U. S. under Constitution. Vol. Ill, 367
(2) Ibid, p. 367
(3) Benton, T. H. Thirty Years] View . Vol. I, p. 77
(4) Lockey, J. B. Pan-Americanism, Its Beginnings, p. 396
(5) Ibid , p. 397.
(6) Arragon, R. P. The Congress of Panama
,
note to p. 404.
»
Rochester, the secretary was confirmed with a vote of 23 to 16'. (1)
TKo \\ yyv W\ ts/\> v -> » t x v*_ till \ \r-w.r oj 1y- t; ^ -.>• ,. | 1 1 n,r',
The uUcnixon of the house of Representative was uaij.ua to the
Congress of Panama as early as December 1G, 1825 when Hamilton of South
Carolina asked for further information on the subject of the Panama
mission, which had "been mentioned in the President' 3 annual), messo.ee.
V/lien he heard that the President intended to send full information to
the House later on, Hamilton postponed the consideration of iiis reso-
lution, retaining the right of "bringing it up again if he so desired.
Adams looked upon this action of Hamilton's as an expression of
the enmity of the opposition in the House.
On January 31, 1826, Hamilton's resolution was again taken up
and after a debate of about four days, was adopted. The desired docu-
ments were sent by President Adams, together with a message from him,
on March 15, 182G, the day after the Senate had confirmed the nomina-
tions of Anderson and Sergeant.
This message of President Adams to the House of Representatives
was "far superior to the message to the Senate." (2) In it President
Adams answered the objections to the Panama, mission which had been
raised in the Senate. He started out by saying his "first and greatest
inducement was to meet in the spirit of kindness and friendship an
overture made in that spirit by three sister Republics of this hemisphere
Then he assures his listeners that the neutrality of the United State
will not be violated; that the assembly at Panama was to be diplomatic
and consultative and not "legislative."
The objects which the United States hoped to attain were again
enumerated as in the message of December twenty- sixth.
The United States delegates were to throw their r/eight against the
recognition of Haiti. As for the discussion of the abolition of the
African slave trade, the United States could have no objection in view
(1) Arragon, R. ?. The Congress of Panama p. 404
(2) Ibid, p. 417
c
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of the fact that in the previous administration a resolution to that
effect had been passed by the House of Representatives. On the question
of religious liberty he said he hoped to advance "principles of religious
-
liberty, not by any interference in the internal concerns" of the nations
but by "claiming for United States citizens, religious freedom."
Finally, a request for an appropriation to cover the expenses of
th e mi s s i on wa s made . ( 1
)
In characterizing the aims of the United States as thus set forth
by President Adams, I.Ir. Arragon says, "The particular objects aimed at
in the Assembly were negative (against commercial discrimination, the
recognition of Haiti, the invasion of Cuba) or v/ere treated in a con-
servative fashion (as religious toleration, the slave trade, the modes
of applying the Honroe Doctrine). With the possible exception of neutral
rights, little positive good was specified." (2)
The President's message and documents were referred to the Committee
on Foreign Relations.
On March 25, 1826, Crowninshield reported that the Committee be-
lieved it to be expedient that the United States be represented at the
Congress of Panama and suggested that an appropriation be made.
On the same day the Ways and lleans Committee reported a bill calling
for an appropriation of $40,000 for defraying the expenses of the mission.
On April 4, 1826, HcLane of Delav;are introduced an amendment to the
resolution of expediency reported by the Foreign Relations Committee,
whereby certain limitations would be placed on the Executive with regard
P to the instructions to be given to the delegates to the congress. This
amendment was superseded by a more drastic one proposed by Buchanan and
until April 21, 1826 a heated debate centered about the adoption of this
(1) Richardson, J. P. Ilessages & Papers of the President s Vol.11, 329-31.
(2) Arragon, R. F. The Congre ss of Panama p. 419
I
latter amendment. In this debate every phase of the subject was dis-
cussed.
However, the administration had nore friends in the House than
in the Senate and among these was the orator, Daniel Webster. He up-
held the administration measure valiantly, making it clear that there
were just two matters for the House to decide : --first , did it Wish to
assume the responsibility of failing to make an appropriation for the
mission after the Senate had confirmed the delegates, and second, did
it wish to overstep and interfere in purely executive prerogatives. (1)
The elements of opposition, however, Were able to muster sufficient
strength to pass the Buchanan amendment. This was a blow at the Execu-
tive and the friends of the administration joined with the out-and-out
opponents of the measure to defeat the resolution of expediency offered
by the Committee on Foreign Relations but also thereby killing the ob-
noxious Buchanan amendment. (2)
Three days later, on April 24, 1326, the appropriation bill v/as
passed; the administration measure had been saved.
Summarization of the Panama Congress case in the Congress of the
United States .
In November 1325 when the Spanish Americans had presented their
formal invitations to the United States to attend the Congress at
Panama, no extended legislative opposition had been expected by Clay.
"Of course," he wrote to Anderson, "the whole movement depends upon
the concurrence of the Senate, which is, however, confidently an-
ticipated." (5)
In his instructions to William B. Rochester, who had been se-
lected as the secretary of the mission, Clay set the dates of December
twenty to January twenty as those, within which, Rochester should make
(1) G-ales & Seaton's Register 1826, column 2254.
(2) Perkins, D. The Konroe Doctrine 1825-1826
,
p. 220
(3) Arragon, R. P. - The Congress of Panama, p. 373

37
hi3 departure for Panama,! (1)
Opposition to the mission however, v/as apparent very soon after
the opening oT Congress • Thus it wo-3 on December 16, 1825, even be-
fore Adams had delivered his special message to the Senate, that
Representative Hamilton asked for further information on the proposed
congress. Senator Branch's resolution against the President came
while the Panama mission v/as still under consideration by the Senate's
Committee on Foreign Relations.
Adams might well write in his diary under date of January 9, 1826,
"This is apparently the first measure in which the opposition are en-
deavoring to array themselves. They are bitter and rancorous, but are
yet discordant among themselves." (2)
Furthermore it must be noted that the debate in Congress was not
on the matter of confirming the delegates or of appropriating funds for
the mission as presented by the Administration, but rather on the matter
of the expediency of sending delegates to attend the Congress and on
the appropriateness of the subjects they were instructed to discuss there.
What was the underlying cause of this great opposition to the ad-
ministration measure? In the case of some, no doubt, there was sin-
cere concern for the best interests of the nation. This is particularly
true of those senators who objected because no clear and sufficient
statement of the aims, methods of organization and procedure, and
powers to be granted to the delegates to the congress had been given
by the Spanish American republics. Also there v/as some sincere fear
and distrust of entangliiig alliances and I have no doubt, some of the
Southern members were sincere in their fear of the Haitian question.
But, it must be said, that for the greater part, the real cause
of the opposition v/as factional jealousy - a dislike of the Adminis-
(1) Arragon, R. P. - The Congress of Panama p. 375
(2) Adams, J. Q. - Memoirs
,
Vol. XII, IPS.
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tration and a determination to make it appear odious. With this as
an underlying motive, the opposition attacked the Panama mission os-
tensibly, because of the reasons discussed above.
Let us here give the opinions of certain historians .who have
studied the matter or at least certain phases of it, very carefully.
J. B. Lockey says, "The opposition to the mission to Panama, in
so far as it was genuine, was based upon Washington 1 s precept against
entangling alliances; but it was in fact largely factitious, and in-
dicated hostility to the administration much more than disapproval of
the idea of co-operation with the new states. The question of slavery
was brought into the discussion for the purpose of inflaming party
passion, but it had practically no effect upon the policy either of
the United States or of the other American States regarding Haiti,
Cuba, and Porto Ilico It is difficult to believe that the United
States would have been less opposed to the transfer of Cuba to another
power or that Colombia and llexico would have been less anxious to ac-
quire it, had there been no slaves in the island." (1)
Dexter Perkins, who has made a special study of the Monroe Doctrine
in this period says, "The vote on these resolutions (i.e., Buchanan's
amendment particularly) was, it is well known, colored with faction;
and to weigh the force of this perverting element is an impossible and
fruitless task The Panama debates contribute nothing to the posi-
tive development of the Monroe Doctrine." (2)
R. F. Arragon says, "A consistent opposition was thus made to the
mea stire by nearly one-half of the senators whose action had the ap-
pearance of that of an organized group; and while the anti-administration
elements in the House did not act similarly as a unit against the mission,
their votes and speeches distinguished both the extreme and moderate
(1) Lockey, J. B. - Pan-Americanism, It s Beginnings , d. 398
(2) Perkins, D. - The iuonroe Doctrine maa-jLsa b
,
p. 221
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groups rather sharply from the loyal supporters of the administration
measure. This wae a division based, not on the merits of the question,
"but on a conscious political antagonism to the successful candidate and
to his Secretary of State on the part of those who had favored hi
3
rivals for the mantle of Ilonroe." (1)
Contemporary opinions as to the underlying cause of the opposition
to the Panama mission are not lacking.
Thus Webster, as early as December 31, 1325 wrote, "An opposition
is evidently brewing. It will show itself on the Panama question." (2)
Again on January 29, 1826 he wrote , "It (i.e., the Panama mission)
is supposed to furnish some plausible grounds for opposition and there
will be a rallying of forces on the occasion." (3)
President Adams was clearly aware of the determined opposition
against him. In his diary of January 31, 1826 he wrote, "This is the
first subject upon which a great effort has been made in both Houses
to combine the discordant elements of the Crawford and Jackson and
Calhoun men into a united opposition against the Administration. It
is at on early stage of its progress but has already become complicated
and admonishes me to proceed with extreme circumspection." (4)
Again on February 3, 1826 he confided to his diary, "There has
been much manoeuvring in the House; first, to defeat the resolution in-
directly; and secondly to clog it with embarrassments to the Execu-
tive." (5)
Henry Clay was also conscious of a factional opposition. Writing
on February 20, 1826 he said, "As to the Panama mission, it has en-
countered much delay and a good deal of opposition in the Senate. ..
(1) Arragon, R. F. - The Congress of Panama p. 461
(2) Webster, D. - Private Correspondence Vol. I, 401. Uebster to Judge
(3) Ibid . Vol. I. p. 401. V/ebster to Ezekial Webster. (Story.
(4) Adams, J. Q. Ilemoirs , Vol. VII, p. Ill
(5) Ibid, p. 111.
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. . There are 301.10 fifteen or sixteen Senators determined to oppose
the administration at all events and that Measure especially. There
are eight or ten others who in private feelings are inimical but who
are restrained by the state of things at their respective homes. When
these' eight or ten unite .... with the others, together they form a
majority The expedients to which it has resorted to procrastinate
the decision, will surprise the country, if it is ever allowed to know
them." (1)
But Adams, Clay, and Webster were all friends of the Panama mission
and wished to see it succeed. What of those opposed to the measure?
Have any of them made statements as to the real motives of the opposi-
tion? The following quotations are from the work of Thomas H. Benton,
one of the leaders of the opposition in the Senate. He wrote, "Though
long since sunk into oblivion it was a master subject on the political
theatre during its day." Again, "Mr, Adams commenced right by asking
the advice of the Senate before he instituted the mission; but the
manner in which the object was pursued made it a, matter of opposition
to the administration to refuse it and greatly impaired the harmony
which ought to exist between the President and the Senate." Also,
"It was very nearly a party vote, the democracy as a party being
against it." Finally, "ITo question in its day excited more heat
and intemperate discussion or more feeling between a President and
Senate." (2)
Martin Van Buren, the leader of the opposition in the Senate,
said in commenting on a talk he had had with Calhoun, "There was also
an obvious (though not expressed) concurrence in opinion between us
that opposition to so prominent a measure of the Administration could
(1) Clay, H. - Works; life, correspondence, speeches. Edited by
(J. Col ton. Vol. IV, pV '137.
(2) All four quotations from Benton, T. H. Thirty Years' View, Vol.1 65-69
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not fail to lead to an ultimate union of efforts for its overthrow. " (1)
Arragon, in commenting on the above quotation sayo, "A concert of
influence was thus inaugurated by these two skillful politicians and
the campaign begun." (2)
Van Buren is also said to have made the remark, "They have beaten
us by a few votes after a hard battle; but if they had only taken the
other side and refused the mission we should have had theml" (3) Such
a remark, if truly attributed to Van Buren, surely shows opposition
merely because of dislike for the Administration or because of faction.
An analysis of the vote in the Senate and the House on the Panama
mission shows some interesting facts.
If the question of slavery were the chief obstacle in the way
of the Panama mission one would expect a vote absolutely on sectional
lines. But such is not the case. The vote in the Senate followed
party lines, strictly. Thus, of the 24 votes in favor of the mission,
8 were from Southern senators and of the 19 votes opposing the mission,
7 were from northern members. (4) Also, we must not forget that the
most forceful upholder of the administration measure in the Senate
was Johnston of Louisiana, himself a slave holder.
In discussing this matter of the partisan vote of the members of
Congress Arragon says, "The comparison of the views of Congressmen
on the presidency in 1824 and 1825 and their attitude in the Panama
Congress question indicates that the lines in the latter contest were
not drawn entirely upon those of the earlier one but almost so, only
one-sixth in the House (19 of 118) and one-third in the Senate (14 of 40)
neglecting such a criterion. An analysis of this minority, moreover,
(1) Arragon, R. F. - The Congress of Panama p. 473, citing from
Van Buren, Autobiography p. 200
(2) Ibid, p. 473
(3) Burgess, J. W. The Middle Period
, p. 153
(4) Lockey, J. B. - Pan-Amer i cani sm , Its Beginnings
, p. 399.

shows that, in practically every case, the contradiction is explicable
on partisan grounds, the change being usually merely a symptom of
passage to another political group, " (1)
YJhatever the cause of the opposition we know that the Panama
mission was before the Senate for two months and three weeks before
the final vote was taken. In the House, almost seven weeks elapsed
before the appropriation bill was voted upon. In all, the case was
before Congress from December 26, 1825 to Hay 3, 1826. (2)
The first result of such a long debate was that the minister
Sergeant and the secretary Rochester, who had been instructed to
leave for Panama by January 20, 1826 at the latest, could not move
on that date.
The other result of such a long and heated debate was that the
factional opposition to the administration was consolidated and thus
was able to bring its weight to bear against later measures of the
Executive.
The delegates to the Congress of Panama were finally commissioned
on May 8, 1826 and received their instructions from Ilr. Clay.
These instructions were not made public until 1829. (3) They
follow along the lines declared by Adams in his messages to Congress.
As these objects have already been mentioned in this paper, only out-
standing features of Clay's instructions will be noted here.
He starts out with the fact that the congress is to be diplomatic
and not legislative in character and all notion of the creation of an
amphictyonic council is to be dismissed.
On the non-colonization claim of the Monroe Doctrine the American
delegates were to work along the line suggested by Adams, i.e., each
(1) Arragon, R. P. - The Congress of Panama p. 486
(2) Gales & Beaton's Register 1826 - column 671 for final action by Senat
(3) For Clay's Instructions see llilcs' Weekly Register Vol. XXXVI,
Kay 28, 1829 pp. 71-80.

nation was to guard its ovm territory against foreign encroachment s
.
Haiti was not to "be recognised by the United States and as to
Cuba, the position always held by the United States on that question
was to be maintained.
One subject mentioned in Clay's instructions of which little was
heard in the debate in Congress was that of an inter-oceanic canal.
Clay believed this project should be carried through not by one nation
but by the united efforts of several. Information as to the practica-
bility of such a project being so meagre, Clay suggested that nothing
more than certain preliminary arrangements be made at that time.
In general, "the spirit of American unity pervades Clay's in-
structions. Dangers to be met, interests to be promoted, problems
to be solved, were common to all and demanded common counsel and
united action." (1)
The Congress of Panama .
The Congress of Panama was formally opened on June 22, 1826 and
adjourned on July 15, 1826. Four nations were represented at the
congress, namely:— Colombia, I.Ie::ieo, Central America, and Peru. Great
Britain and Holland sent unofficial agents.
Among the nations which, though invited were not represented by
delegates at the congress were Chile, Buenos Aires, Bolivia, Brazil,
and the United States.
The absence of the United States was due ehiefljr to the prolonged
debate in Congress which prevented the delegates from making an early
start for the seat of the congress, Mien the ministers were finally
commissioned, however, other factors arose which prevented their at-
tendance at the Congress of Panama.
Richard C.Anderson, American minister to Colombia, and one of
the delegates confirmed by the Senate, was instructed by Clay (2) to
(1) Loclcey, J. B. - Pan-Americanism. Its Beginnings, p. 427
(2) Arragon, R. P. - The Congress "of Panama p." ,6 rr6 citing from Bureau o
Index & Archives, Instructions to Uinisters Vol. X.
p
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leave Bogota, travel to Porto Bello and there await the arrival of
Serjeant, whence together they v/ere to travel overland to Panama.
Accordingly, Anderson 3et out from Bogota "before the middle of
June. His journey took him down the Liagdaldna . Delays in the journey,
such as the stranding of his "boat, occurred. Already far from robust,
the dangerous summer climate of the region "brought on a fever. In this
condition Anderson reached Cartegcna on July 14, 1826 and after lying
ill for ten days, died there.
In regard to John Sergeant, the other delegate, many historians
are in error. They say that he reached Panama after the adjournment
of the congress. As a matter of fact, Sergeant never left the United
States for Panama. The long debate in Congress delayed his confirma-
tion so long that he saw it would be the summer season before he could
start for Panama. He feared the dangerous summer climate of the region
and refused to go at that time, offering his resignation to Clay. (1)
Clay, recalling the trouble he had had in obtaining the confirmation
of Sergeant by the Senate, refused his resignation ojid offered to de-
lay his departure until the autumn and then perhaps to a more salubrious
region to which Clay was hoping the congress might be adjourned.
We have further proofs that Sergeant did not leave the United
States for Panama in the summer of 1826. On July 4, 1826, the Presi-
dent's father, John Adams, died and the President traveled to Quiney,
Massachusetts to settle affairs. In his diary the President speaks
of the various persons he met in his travels. Under date of July 10,
1826 he wrote, "We arrived at Philadelphia about nine. I called upon
Mr. John Sergeant At noon I embarked in the steamboat Philadel-
phia for Trenton. John Sergeant determined to go with me to Hew York. "(2)
(1) Arragon, R. F. The Congress of Panama
,
p. 500 quoting £rom Sergeant
to Clay, Hay 8, 1826 in State Dept. Package #156.
(2) Adams, J. Q. - Memoirs Vol. VII, p. 126.
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On July 11, 1826 lie wrote, "'Jo readied New York at half-pant
eleven I stopped and dined at the City Hotel. Sergeant (and
others) dined wijbh us." (1)
On these very dates, July 10 and 11, the Congress of
f^-nak-m^ -e-f- Panamo, was in session.
One further proof that Sergeant did not leave for Panama in
the summer of 1826 is the fact that the warship Lexington v/hich, ac-
cording to Clay's instructions of Kay 8, 1826 , was to have conveyed
Sergeant to Porto Bello, spent the entire season from June to Septem-
ber on a cruise in northern waters* (2)
Sergeant did, however, leave for Tacubaya, Mexico , in the autumn
of 1826 to attend the adjourned meeting of the congress. (3)
To illustrate how misfortune seemed to follow the Panama mission
I cite the case of Mr. Y/hortOTv, a messenger employed by Clay to carry
his regrets as to the absence of Mr. Sergeant and other dispatches to
the assembled nations at Panama. Y/hclrton left Few York early in June.
His ship was wrecked off the coast of the Bahamas. Finally V/htxrton
sticceeded in obtaining other shipping but reached Cartegena on July 26,
1826, two days after the death of Anderson and eleven days, after the
congress had adjourned. (4)
As for the deliberations and conclusions of the Congress of
Panama, it is not a part of this paper to discuss them. Suffice it
to say that Ifa treaty of perpetual union, league and confederation"
was drawn up as were also various conventions relating to future
meetings, to the qualifications of members, and to the kind and amount
of military and naval resources to be contributed by each toward a
(1) Adams, J. Q. Uemoirs Vol. VII, p. 126
(2) Lockey, J. B. - Pan-American i sm, Its Beginnings
,
p. 315 citing from
American State Papers, ITaval Affairs, II, 731, 745
(3) Ibid, p. 348
(4) Arragon, R. P. - The Congress of Panama p. 502
t
permanent army and navy. (1)
Of the four nations assembled, only one, Colombia, finally rati-
fied the conventions of the Congress of Panama. (2) Simon Bolivar,
who had not been a delegate to the congress, wo.3 disappointed at the
outcome and opposed the ratification of the treaties and conventions
of the congress. (3)
Among the worst enemies which the congress had however, were
the dangerous summer climate and conditions prevalent at Panama.
Yellow fever was feared by all. In one month, Dawkins , the British
agent, had lost his secretary and one other member of his group. The
Colombian representative had lost two servants. (4)
So, chiefly because of these conditions it was agreed to adjourn
the meeting to Tacubaya, a healthful place not far from Mexico City.
The adjourned meeting was to open within eight months of the closing
at Panama . ( 5
)
Sergeant, accordingly, traveled to Tacubaya. Poinsett, the
American minister to Mexico, was to take the place of Anderson.
According to the plan of the President, Sergeant was to leave
Philadelphia at about the middle of November 1826. (6)
We know that he was in Mexico in January 1827 because Clay,
in a letter to Sergeant and Poinsett, written in March 1827 mentions
the fact that he had received a dispatch which had been sent from
Mexico on January 19, 1827 by Sergeant. (7).
(1) Lockey, J. B. - Pan-Americanism, It s Beginnings p. 340
(2) Ibid , p. 347 ~ "
(3) Ibid. p. 347
(4) Ibid, p. 345
(5) ITiles 1 Weekly Register Vol. XXXVI (1829) Clay to Sergeant
and Poinsett, p. 80.
(6) Adams, J. Q. Memoirs Vol. XII, p. 160
(7) Niles* Weekly~RegisTer Vol. XXXVI (1829) p. 80
r<
Clay instructed. Sergeant to remain in Kexico until
June 1, 1827, after which late, if the congress had. not as-
sembled, he v/as at liberty to return to the United, states.
If the congress met after that date, Poinsett v/as to repre-
sent the United States at it. (1)
Howeverj in the months following the adjournment of the
Congress of Panama, political upheavals occurred in v^riovs
Spanish American states with the result that Colombia a.lone
,
of all Spanish America, sent representatives to Tacubaya
and thus the adjourned meeting of the Congress of Panama never
took place.
Conclusion.
IThe utiaos t the "United States might have gaine d had her
delegates attended the Congress of p anama.
Had the United States been represented at the Congress
of Panama she might have secured the lasting friendship of
Spanish America. This would show itself in a desire for co-
operation in all matters concerning the United States and
her neighbors to the South.
In these matters the United States, acting the part of
the !T elder brother" would take the lead and show the way. latin
America wo uld acquiesce in this leadership because of the disin-
terested, fair policy displayed by the United States.
(1) Niles* Weekly Register Vol. XKXVI (1829) p. 80
r
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In such a way the government at Washington would he able
to have certain favorite doctrines adopted by all ijierica. Such,
for example, are the doctrines that "free ships make free goods,"
that "paper blockades" should be abolished, that the rights of
neutrals in time of war should be upheld. When all America had
united in declaring such principles, Europe must, perforce, take
heod.
Then too, %] e Congress of Panama, if successful, would have
resulted in a great increase in trade between the United States
and latin America. This too was one of the subjects which the
United states delegates had been instructed to bring forward.
The increasing intercourse thus resulting would have brought
about a clearer understanding and greater sympathy of one part of
America for the other and the amount of misunderstanding which
exists today would have been wiped out long ago.
If the Congress of Panama could have produced the results
named above it was a tremendous mistake for the United States not
to have been represented at it.
Factors V/orlcing against such a Kapijy Outcome
But was it possible that the gains mentioned above could
have been made? Most likely, not. There were certain factors
militating against such a successful and happy issue from
the Congress of Panama.
Thus^ the attitude of ^reat Britain was a troublesome
point. V,re have seen earlier in this paper that Canning was
jealous of the United States; he was opposed to the united States
assuming the hegemony of the Western Hemisphere. Temperley, the
c*
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English historian, speaking of Canning's polie; with regard to
the Congress of Panama says, "His plan seems to have been to de-
tach the South American states from alliance with or dependence
on the United States." (1)
Also, Canning had expressed himself as opposed to any
change in maritime law such as the delegates from the United States
had been instructed to bring up for discussion. (2) Ead the
United States been represented at the congress she undoubtedly
would have clashed with Great Britain.
Then too, Great Britain would have exerted her influence,
which was great, with Spanish America, to resist the intended
program of the United States. On this point Temperley says
of Canning, "He meant to indicate to the South jjnerican states
that their true friend was distant England, not the adjacent
English-speaking land." (3)
Hence our hopes of furthering friendly relations with
Latin America would have received a setback.
Not only with Great Britain was there a possibility of a
clash as a result of the successful attendance of the United
States at the Congress of Panama. It does not stretch the imagi-
nation too much to 1 see the opposition of the Holy Alliance
aroused. If Great Britain and the Holy Alliance both thought
that an American confederacy was arising to counteract or
balance that of Europe, what suspicions and entanglements might
not have resulted'
( 1 ) Temperley , H.W. Y. - The Later Americ
a
n policy of George C anning
in American fTist7orical lieview Vol. Xl p. 7 S3
(2) See page 11, above.
( 3 j Temp erley, . H.W.V. - The Later ximerican Policy of Geo. Canning
in American Historical "Review Vol* XI p. THE
r
But aside from the fear of clashing v/ith Europe, the suc-
cessful attendance of the United States at the Congress of
Panama seemed doomed by conditions in Latin America itself.
The chief object of Spanish America in calling the
Congress of Panama was to take steps toward protecting them-
selv es from possible attacks of S yain or the Holy alliance.
A confederation of Spanish American states, each contributing
its quota tov/ard a common armj? and navy was contemplated.
Because of the possible protection they might afford,
both the United States and Great Britain were invited to attend.
The Spanish Americans read into the Monroe Doctrine the
intention of the United States to protect all America from en-
croachments from Europe and they wished closer contacts v/ith
the United States on this ground.
Thus it can be seen that the Congress of Panama, v/hile
approaching Pan-Americanism as we know it today, had net in
reality the same foundation. We understand Pan-Americanism
as a movement aiming to bring about a more sympathetic under-
standing and a finer co-operation between the various nations
of America. The Congress of Panama was called solely for the
protection of the new republics and included any nations likely
to help in this matter, not confining the invitations to
America alone.
How doomed to disappointment the Spanish Americans were
to be when the attitude of the United States was made clear
to them I Absolutely no political alliances; no extension of
the interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine beyond that de-
clared in the message of President Adams i (1)
(1) See page 18 above.
»
This apparent lack of sympathy by the United States in
the aims of Spanish America would be fertile ground for the
growth of feelings of animosity, suspicion and perhaps hatred
toward us.
;,lso. at the Congress of Panama delegates from only four
of the Spanish American republics assembled. To be sure,
others would have been represented but were late in appointin
delegates. But Euenos Aires, destined to become one of the
leading states of South America, thought the idea of a con-
federacy impracticable and was opposed to the congress. If
the mited States had succeeded in establishing satisfying
relations with the nations assembled at the congress, what
of those that failed to Join it? Could the loo3ced-for good
results be obtained while Buenos Aires was outside the arrange
ments made with the United States? (1)
Then too, the questions of Cuba and Haiti were slated
il&T discussion at xanama. Certain parts of Spanish America
took a directly opposite stand on these matters from that
of the United States. Could these delicate questions have
been smoothed out amicably and satisfactorily to all?
But perhaps the most serious obstacle to the inauguration
of closer and more friendly relations between Latin iineriea
and the United States lay in the unstable political conditions
of the new republics.
The treaties and conventions arrived at in the Congress
of Panama in 1326 were ratified by only one of the four gov-
ernments represented. The adjourned meeting to be held at
Tacubaya was never convened because political upheavals pre-
(1) Lockey, J. B. Pan.
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vented all the states but Colombia from Bending dele ;.tes.
Thus if the United States did arrive at any agreements
with the southern republics, how long would Spanish ^ineriea uphold
its end of the bargain?
The facts are that the Latin American governments v/ere
too unstable and too lacking in political experience to live
up to any agreements or even to follow the leadership of the
United States in complicated political or international questions.
And what of the United States? V/ouli any agreements made
at Panama have been ratified by that government or would they
have been turned into a political "foot-ball" for the use of
Congress. The long debate preceding the confirmation of the
delegates to the Congress at Panama leads one to think that a
similar delay might have occurred upon the question of ratify-
ing any agreements arrived at there.
By failing to be represented at the Congress of Panama,
it is probable that the United States saved itself much trouble
as, for example, a clash with Great Britain. On this point
Temperley, in speaking of Canning says, "The line which he
adopted was likely to lead at length to conflict between
the United States and Bngland." (1)
Also, the possibilities of a clash with the Ploly alliance,
of arousing great animosity in Spanish America towards the
United States and of entering into those engagements which in
all likelihood would lead to those entangling alliances so
dreaded by our statesmen were other points of trouble the United
States had avoided.
( 1 ) Temperley , H.V/. V The Later Americ an Poli cy of Geo. Canning
in American Historical Review Vol. XI p. 79 6
s
Did the United States miss an opportunity for good?
Bearing all the points Just enumerated in mind it may
be safely said that the United States did not miss an op-
portunity for good by failing to be represented at the Con-
gress of Panama.
In closing I shall quote the v/ords of the historian
J. W. Burgess, who upholds this conclusion. He says, "It
is not probable that any opportunity for doing good or
receiving good was lost by the non-attendance of representa-
tives from the United States upon the deliberations oi' the
Panama Congress. It is far more probable that both the doing
and the suffering of injury v/ere escaped." (1)
(1) Burgess, J. W«. T'h.e Middle Period p. 154.
m
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